Home
Program Description
News and Current Events
Homeland Security Focus Areas
Research Programs and Opportunities Conferences and Symposia
National University Consortium On Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Related Sites
Program Development and Support Contact Us

























Homeland Security Focus Areas

Bio-Terrorism

From the July/August issue of "Technology Review":
Biotechnology and bioterrorism

Biotechnologists are facing restrictions similar to those
imposed on physicists during the cold war, says Daniel J.
Kevles, a professor of history at Yale University. However,
biotechnology is a thornier issue, he says.

At the beginning of the nuclear age, physicists had to submit to
stringent security restrictions on classified research and even
some that was unclassified, Mr. Kevles says. But while
physicists of that era were banned from certain types of
research if their political affiliations were suspect, today's
biologists are judged by their nationality or ethnicity, he
says. "There is no appeal against the denial of access to
selected biological agents on the basis of nationality; it
applies absolutely without exception," he writes.

With foreign-born students holding a quarter of all biology
Ph.D.'s awarded in the United States, the potential impact on
American science is great, Mr. Kevles says. "Visa delays and
denials have already interfered with or caused the cancellation
of important international conferences, disrupted careers, and
slowed research projects -- including, according to media
reports, an anti-HIV drug, a vaccine against the West Nile
virus, and sensors to detect biowarfare agents," he writes.

In early nuclear physics, it was relatively simple to draw the
line between what should be classified and what should not, but
much of biomedical research has multiple applications. "Results
in almost any area of basic molecular biology may be fuel for
bioterrorism," he writes, "but it can also help defend against
it and serve the needs of civilian and military health." Thus,
Mr. Kevles says, some scientists are concerned that the
restrictions on biotechnology could weaken the field without
significantly reducing the risk of bioterrorism.

A portion of the article is available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/kevles0703.asp

July 21, 2003
Focus on bioterror shelves other federal health efforts
By Emily Heil, CongressDaily

Before the terror attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, and the anthrax contamination scare a month later, public health advocates were clamoring for attention on Capitol Hill for a full plate of issues-ranging from more nutritious school lunches to lowering diabetes rates.
Since then, domestic public health initiatives have skyrocketed to prominence-but efforts have focused almost exclusively on bioterrorism preparedness, a trend that critics fear has forced traditional public health concerns into the legislative backseat.
"Bioterrorism is a serious issue, and we support all the funding the administration has provided for it," said Don Hoppert, director of federal and congressional affairs for the American Public Health Association. "At the same time, we don't want that to eclipse everything else."
This year, increases in general public health funding have been scant. Funding for the Centers for Disease Control is slated to be nearly $4.6 billion for fiscal 2004, up slightly from about $4.3 billion in 2003. But the overall increases are largely targeted to bioterror readiness, and accompany cuts to other key areas. For example, public health workforce development funding under the Health Resources and Services Administration is down by $1.3 million in 2004 legislation.
And public health legislative policy initiatives primarily have been security-related-including a bill to compensate those who become ill from side effects of vaccines protecting health care workers against smallpox, which many fear could be used as a biological weapon in a terrorist attack.
Lawmakers are now considering legislation enacting President Bush's "Project Bioshield" designed to encourage commercial development of countermeasures to biological or chemical weapons.
Some observers argue that strengthening the public health infrastructure in preparation for a possible biological attack means the system will be better able to handle other emerging diseases and outbreaks that are part of the regular public health mission.
The outbreak of SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, was a "test case" for an attack, CDC officials told lawmakers during recent hearings focused on the illness. Federal dollars doled out to states for bioterrorism preparedness have helped pay for infrastructure like hospital equipment and better communication systems.
That may be so, Hoppert said. But he contended that the day-to-day work of the CDC-encompassing initiatives aimed at a gamut of common killers such as heart disease and strokes-also needs more of a focus.
"Our goal should be one health system that can handle anything, whether it's SARS or a biological attack," Hoppert said. "We need to be looking at the diseases that are actually killing Americans today."
One non-security related bright spot in the public health landscape is legislation expected soon from Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., and Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., addressing disparities in health care among minority populations.
Blacks, Hispanics and other minority groups have disproportionately higher rates of many diseases, including heart disease, breast cancer and HIV/AIDs. Statistics also show minorities are more likely to die as a result of such diseases.
Work on targeting the disparities among those populations began before the terrorist attacks and subsequent focus on security measures took center stage-with Frist and Kennedy co-authoring legislation in 2000 beginning to study and provide education on minority health problems.
Now both senators are again considering legislation on the issue, although it is unclear whether they will again collaborate on a bill.
Frist vowed in June to introduce legislation improving access to health care for minorities and increasing diversity among health care workers. A Frist spokesman said the bill likely would debut sometime after the August recess.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus have been providing suggestions on potential legislation, a CBC spokesman said, and one CBC member, Del. Donna Christian-Christensen, D-V.I., may introduce companion legislation in the House.

Anthrax hammers immune system

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published July 17, 2003

SSOCIATED PRESS
The anthrax bug swiftly disarms the sentinels of the body's immune system, hampering the body's ability to defend against the potentially lethal bioterrorism agent, a new study shows.
The results suggest medical treatment to boost the immune system at the earliest stages of infection could counteract the toxin that anthrax produces in its initial attack. Antibiotics, like Cipro, could be used in concert to kill the bacteria themselves.
The federally supported study began in the months following the 2001 anthrax attacks that killed five persons.
In those attacks, which remain unsolved, one of the first victims was sick for days before he was seen by doctors, who suspected a case of the flu. His white blood count, a sign of bacterial infection, was only slightly elevated. That suggests the anthrax bacteria were able to fly under the watchful radar of his immune system and proliferate.
As the 2001 anthrax crisis spread, physicians wondered how the weaponized bug was working. In the new study using mice, researchers at Emory University in Atlanta, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health provide some fundamental answers. They found that anthrax toxin targets front-line immune agents called dendritic cells. Once the bacteria disarm the dendritic cells, they can evade the immune system's other defenders and spread unchecked.
Details appear in this week's issue of the journal Nature.
"Anything that impairs the function of dendritic cells is really hitting at the Achilles' heel of the immune system. That is exactly what anthrax lethal toxin appears to do," said principal author Bali Pulendran of Emory University.
A previous study in the journal Science last year used test-tube experiments to show that anthrax also inhibits and destroys large white blood cells called macrophages. The immune system deploys those cells to fend off microbes.
That presumably also would allow the anthrax bacteria to spread, again unhindered by the immune system.
Together, the two studies show anthrax relies on multiple mechanisms to disrupt the body's ability to stave off infection, Mr. Pulendran said.
Michael Karin of the University of California at San Diego, and lead author of the Science study, said it was both "interesting and curious" that anthrax relied on different strategies to attack different immune agents.
"What is important in the new work is they show that the bacterium can actually inhibit the activation of dendritic cells without killing them," said Mr. Karin, who was not connected with the Nature study.
A Maryland company gained approval from the Food and Drug Administration last month to begin human tests of a drug that blocks the toxin. And the recent deciphering of the genetic makeup of anthrax likely will lead to other drugs and vaccines to thwart the germ.
Understanding of the toxin's effect on the immune system also could lead to beneficial uses for the toxin. Pulendran said new drugs might be developed to aid those suffering from auto-immune diseases, severe allergies or who risk organ rejection after transplant surgery.

Team Developing Self-Administered Bioterrorism Triage System

Experts from Harvard and Georgetown Universities are developing a "do-it-yourself triage system" that will enable the public to determine more accurately whether they need to seek emergency care in the event of a bioterrorism attack, the Washington Post reported. Georgetown University biodefense coordinator Michael D. McDonald and Harvard psychiatrist Stephen E. Locke have developed a sophisticated electronic questionnaire that would give users immediate advice on how to proceed if they suspect they have been exposed to a biological or chemical weapon. The system, which could be programmed for a variety of pathogens and chemical agents, would perform an instantaneous medical risk assessment based on users' responses to the questionnaire. It would then dispense a set of instructions, raging from 'stay at home' to 'seek treatment at a designated facility'. Dr. Robert E. Armstrong of the National Defense University and Dr. Stephen D. Prior of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies point out that in the event of bioterror attacks, there will be no need for the public to rush to emergency rooms. In most cases, people will have a window of several days to get vaccinated or receive antibiotics. "Many patients we saw in our emergency room during the anthrax attacks [of 2001] would not have needed to come in for care if they could have had simple questions answered," said the director of a large emergency room who spoke to the Post on the condition of anonymity. "You could lop 20 or 30 percent off the top."

ANALYSIS: In the midst of a bioterror attack, a major challenge for authorities will be to maintain calm among the public so that first responders can do their jobs effectively. George C. Benjamin, executive director of the American Public Health Association, told Intellibridge that he is optimistic about this self-administered system. "People use these kinds of systems everyday; for instance, through pediatrician's offices and live nurse help lines. These systems work, and the public has confidence in them," Benjamin said. "The real challenge is to have equality across our communities. But even those who are not well off enough to have a computer often have access to a cell phone." However, since the triage system would be accessed via the telephone or internet, it would be vulnerable to telephone service interruptions, as evidenced during the 11 September attacks when a high volume of calls jammed phone lines in New York City and Washington, D.C. Martin Schram, author of "Avoiding Armageddon," pointed out in a recent Washington Times article that the "most deadly and menacing" bioterrorism attacks will unfold slowly, as victims are discovered over a period of days. An electronic questionnaire for citizens concerned about exposure could be particularly helpful in a situation like that, especially in helping to limit the number of people visiting emergency rooms, thus easing clinicians' workload and limiting the spread of disease. Nevertheless, many experts doubt that the public, engulfed in the panic of a bioterror attack, would choose to act calmly and rationally enough to utilize such a self-administered electronic triage system. "Some people would do it, but the great majority wouldn't be able to do it. The major engine is fear," said Ken Alibek, George Mason University biodefense specialist.

HHS Secretary Thompson Proposes Local Government Bioterrorism Advisory Group

Speaking at a National Association of Counties (NACO) meeting in Milwaukee on 11 July, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson called on hundreds of local officials to form an advisory group to help ensure that federal money for bioterrorism preparedness and public health reaches the right places, according to a NACO statement. Of the $1.1 billion that was disbursed to states last year, only 41 percent went to local programs and government. "I know full well that if we're going to have an incident in America, it's going to be you at the local level that's going to make sure that we're able to counteract it, be able to contain it and be able to respond," Thompson told NACO, according to the Associated Press. Thompson pledge his commitment to greater local involvement in terrorism funding decisions announcing his willingness to tour counties and cities to discover for himself how terrorism preparedness funding is being used and where more funding is needed.

ANALYSIS: In his address to NACO, Thompson also recapped the changes he has made to the department to prepare it, and the rest of the country, for a bioterrorism attack, according to AP. He cited his establishment of a "war room" to facilitate quick communication with local, state, and foreign public health officials and boosting public health mobilization capabilities including HHS' 8,000 medical personnel, 50 tons of medical supplies and equipment, and 400 million smallpox vaccines ready to be deployed in the event of a bioterrorism attack. While Thompson seemed confident of local governments being able to respond in the event of an attack, he encouraged county leaders to ensure that sufficient numbers of medical personnel are vaccinated against smallpox so that the rest of the state can be vaccinated within 10 days. Establishing an advisory group to facilitate communication across all levels of government also will likely result in critical information reaching local officials faster, important factors in bioterrorism preparedness and response.

New Technology Can Detect Bitterer Agents Within Seconds

A new misdetection device, developed by researchers at MIT and recently reported on in the journal Science, can detect dangerous virus or bacteria in mail, air or water within seconds of contact, AP reported. The researchers, funded mostly by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DRAPE), spliced luminescent genes found in jelly fish into mouse white blood cells. The experiment resulted in cells that glow when they come in contact with dangerous pathogens. Dubbed Canary (cellular analysis and notification of antigen risks and yields), the detection device has successfully detected pathogens most likely to be used in a bitterer attack including anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia and encephalitis. A significant improvement over other detection systems, Canary can be operated by almost anyone, even without advanced training. "It is very simple to operate," said MIT researcher Todd Rider. "The cells do all the hard work. Nature has designed them to detect bacteria and viruses." The technology is so sophisticated that it can detect the difference between SIRS and the common cold in patients, AP reported. And perhaps more importantly, the detection device works on site in 30 seconds to 3 minutes, eliminating the need to send samples to be studied at a lab.

ANALYSIS: The simplicity of the system will allow first responders and others authorities to test for the presence of dangerous biological agents in high risk areas like airports, subways, and even streets, allowing for a quick response in the event of a bioterrorism attack. Rider said that the detection system can even be used to test food and water for the presence of disease-causing E. coli bacteria. The application of this kind of technology could greatly assist various kinds of biodefense operations including essential processes like detection of anthrax in the U.S. postal system.

Study: Federal Agencies Lack Sufficiently Trained Personnel to Respond to Bioterror Attack

A study released on 8 July found that federal agencies responsible for biodefense preparedness lack the medical and scientific expertise and resources necessary to efficiently counteract a bioterrorism attack, according to the media reports. The Partnership for Public Service, a Washington, D.C. non-governmental organization (NGO) that seeks to attract talented and dedicated individuals to the U.S. Civil Service, identified "a serious underinvestment in the human side of addressing the bioterrorism threat," said President and CEO Max Stier. "Perhaps more than any other terrorist threat, bioterrorism will place huge burdens on small pools of medical, scientific and technical expertise...These organizations are already exhibiting hairline cracks - some would say fractures - that may presage disaster," the study concluded, according to the New York Times. The NGO identified several agencies currently understaffed including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the Food and Drug Administration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Food Safety and Inspection Service.

ANALYSIS: The study is but the latest in a growing body of negative assessments regarding the nation's preparedness against a catastrophic terrorist attack. In contrast to this study on federal preparedness, a June study by the Council of Foreign Relations cited underfunding of first responders as a major soft spot in the nation's preparedness. The Partnership for Public Service's study not surprisingly pointed out that far more resources are being devoted to first responder biodefense training than what is allocated to federal agencies. Federal agencies will encounter "significant and unavoidable hurdles" as they try to fill gaps in critical biodefense expertise given the large numbers of personnel eligible to retire in the next five years and the draw of more lucrative jobs in the private sector, the New York Times reported. "Based on our interviews with officials from these agencies and other areas of biodefense research we found that the federal employees responsible for our defenses against bioterrorist attacks constitute a 'civilian thin blue line' that is retreating both in terms of capacity and expertise," the study cautioned.

July 6, 2003
Report Calls U.S. Agencies Understaffed for Bioterror
By DAVID JOHNSTON

WASHINGTON, July 5 - The government is likely to be overwhelmed in the event of a bioterrorism attack because of serious shortages in skilled medical and scientific personnel, according to a study by a public service advocacy group.

"Perhaps more than any other terrorist threat, bioterrorism will place huge burdens on small pools of medical, scientific and technical expertise," the study concluded. "These organizations are already exhibiting hairline cracks - some would say fractures - that may presage disaster."

The study, which focused on five federal biodefense agencies, will be made public on Tuesday. It was prepared by the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit group founded in 2001 that seeks to attract more qualified people to government service.

The study found that the anthrax mailings in 2001, which killed five people, created confusion and heavily burdened the federal agencies that responded to the incident.

The attacks forced employees at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to work around the clock and to sleep in their laboratories as they performed tests on tens of thousands of specimens.

The study suggested that a larger attack involving infectious diseases would probably be overwhelming.

A planning exercise in 2001 called Dark Winter, which involved the simulated release of smallpox virus, showed that crucial public health decisions had to be made in the early stages of such an event, but the study said policy makers "were generally unfamiliar with the character of bioterrorist attacks."

Billions of dollars have been allocated for so-called first responders like police officers, firefighters, ambulance and hospital workers, and National Guard units to improve their training for emergencies involving chemical, biological and nuclear attacks.

But the study found that far fewer resources have been sought by the federal government for medical and scientific experts.

"We have uncovered a serious underinvestment in the human side of addressing the bioterrorism threat," Max Stier, president and chief executive of the partnership, said in an interview.

"Each of the five agencies plays a central role in responding to the bioterrorism threat," he said. "The resources they have are stretched too thin."

The group recommended that the government undertake a campaign including the recruitment of biodefense experts trained in fields like genetics, infectious disease medicine, bacteriology, microbiology, pharmacology, epidemiology and the physics of aerosol attacks.

The study said the federal agencies that faced serious staffing issues were the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the Food and Drug Administration, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the Food Safety and Inspection Service.

Representatives of several agencies that have jurisdiction over counterterrorism programs - the Homeland Security Department, the Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health and the disease control centers - declined to comment on the study's findings.

The study found that there were far too few people in the government with the skills needed to respond effectively to a bioterror attack.

"Based on our interviews with officials from these agencies and other areas of biodefense research," the study said, "we found that the federal employees responsible for our defenses against bioterrorist attacks constitute a `civilian thin blue line' that is retreating both in terms of capacity and expertise."

The study, based on interviews with senior agency officials and a review of technical literature on the subject, cited several specific problems. It found that biodefense agencies struggled to hire employees with adequate scientific and medical expertise, and concluded that the need for highly trained personnel would increase, while the supply of such talent is likely to decline.

At the same time, these agencies were found to be losing some of their most talented employees because of government pay systems geared less to outstanding performance than to longevity in service.

Moreover, the agencies are likely to face "significant and unavoidable hurdles" in maintaining staffing levels because half of the employees in critical jobs are eligible to retire in the next five years, the study found.

Even efforts to fix the problems are likely to run into difficulty. The study cited the "byzantine hiring process" used by the federal government, which it said had already left some agencies without employees with the appropriate skills to respond to a bioterror attack.

Flu Virus Poses Greater Bioterrorism Threat than Anthrax, Smallpox

The influenza virus, commonly overlooked as a potential weapon of terror, has been found to have a greater destructive potential than smallpox or anthrax, according to a report in the July issue of the UK's Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. Dr. Mohammed Madjid and other researchers from the University of Texas found that the influenza virus could be a prime bioterrorism agent since it is easily transmissible, readily available, has a short incubation period - making it difficult to immunize, and may not be immediately identified as a terrorist attack, the report stated. Researchers at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, based at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC, are close to completely sequencing the flu virus that caused the 1918 pandemic that killed close to 40 million people, according to Congressional Quarterly. While noting that he does not believe the Institute will release the sequence, which rogue scientists could recreate, Madjid said, "We must, since the terrorist attacks of September and October 2001, consider the possibility of malicious genetic engineering to create more virulent strains" that can be used in a bioterrorism attack. Madjid theorized that the release of a genetically-altered, aerosol flu virus on public transportation, like a plane or train, could result in a devastating flu epidemic.

ANALYSIS: The report specifically mention world leaders as targets of flu virus attacks because they may be susceptible to the illness due to age, and, give their frequent travel and contact with the public, they would be ideal for spreading the virus. It recommended that governments take steps to prevent an outbreak, including expanding immunization, increasing security at labs working with influenza viruses, stockpiling antiretroviral drugs, contemplating a federal vaccine-development program, and expanding surveillance of the virus, including antiviral filters, biosensors, and virus-detecting ventilation systems. The report also recommended that organizations like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) bring together experts to "study the matter" and work on a strategy for combating influenza as a bioterrorism weapon.

CQ TODAY - HOMELAND SECURITY
June 26, 2003 - 2:27 p.m.
House Committee Approves $5.6 Billion for Project Bioshield
By Kate Schuler, CQ Staff

The Select Homeland Security Committee on Thursday became the third House committee to approve legislation that seeks to encourage the development of vaccines and treatments to combat bioterrorism.
The bill was approved by voice vote after the committee unanimously adopted a substitute amendment by Chairman Christopher Cox, R-Calif., and ranking Democrat Jim Turner of Texas. The substitute amendment, adopted 29-0, would authorize $5.6 billion for President Bush's Project Bioshield, a 10-year initiative to develop and stockpile vaccines and medications to combat a bioterrorism attack.
The measure would relax federal acquisition procedures and expedite the normal peer review process for grants, contracts and cooperative agreements related to bioterrorism. It also would permit the government, in the event of a national emergency, to make certain treatments available to the public prior to Food and Drug Administration approval.
The bill would build on 2002 legislation that authorized funds to increase the nation's stockpile of medicines and vaccines. It includes an advance-funding mechanism that was worked out with appropriators who had balked at giving the administration the guaranteed funding Bush requested.
Drug companies sought funding guarantees that would take effect before they begin developing drugs and vaccines to combat diseases such as smallpox, anthrax, Ebola and bubonic plague. Without such guarantees, they warned, there would be little financial incentive to produce those drugs, which otherwise would have little market.
The Cox-Turner substitute amendment would authorize additional funds for intelligence analysts in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and require that the department have access to classified information from other government departments regarding chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents.
It also would specify a variety of ways to evaluate Project Bioshield for effectiveness, a provision arising from lawmakers' concerns about the willingness and ability of private companies to fulfill the mandate of the bill.
"While I very much hope that the private sector will develop the medicines we need, I believe that ultimately the government will have to either supplement what the private sector does, or take on the entire job itself," Turner said.
But Cox said, "We must draw on the expertise of the private sector," adding, "Bioshield creates a homeland security market."
The substitute allows the government to use funds authorized under the bill to develop an "in house" capacity to produce and market vaccines itself if private companies prove too slow in developing such biologics and drugs.
By 17-18, the committee rejected an amendment by Louise M. Slaughter, D-N.Y., that would have barred Project Bioshield contracts with U.S. companies that move their headquarters offshore to places such as Bermuda in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes.
Cox joined panel Democrats to defeat, 19-19, an amendment by Billy Tauzin, R-La., that would have stripped the bill of language that would permit the government, in times of emergency, to end a contract with a company if federal officials determine there is a better way to produce the needed vaccine.
The House Energy and Commerce Committee approved the bill May 15 and the Government Reform Committee followed suit May 22.
Companion Senate legislation has stalled because of a dispute over the administration's insistence on a guaranteed funding stream.

Firm's Anthrax Drug Cleared for Human Tests
By Justin Gillis
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, June 25, 2003; Page E01

A Rockville biotechnology company plans to announce today that it has received government permission to launch human tests of a drug designed to combat anthrax, the biowarfare agent that killed five people and terrified Congress in 2001.
Human Genome Sciences Inc. appears to be ahead of several competitors to develop such a compound. Its drug, Abthrax, could be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration for approval in months, presenting the Bush administration with a test of its stated commitment to buy anti-terrorism drugs if industry takes the trouble to develop them.
The drug is a synthetic antibody, a type of protein similar to antibodies produced by the immune system, that neutralizes the main toxin produced by the anthrax germ. Anthrax can already be treated with antibiotics, but drugs like the one Human Genome Sciences is developing might be useful as an adjunct to or replacement for antibiotics in several situations.
The drug is on an unusually fast path.
Anthrax is rare as a naturally occurring disease, and, because it's potentially fatal, humans can't ethically be exposed to it in tests. That means the only test available to show the new drug works is in animals. Human Genome Sciences said the drug has already passed that test, showing marked improvement in survival for animals that received the new drug and were exposed to anthrax spores.
The company has now received FDA permission to test the drug in people, but only to see if it can be administered safely. The test subjects won't be exposed to anthrax spores. The initial safety tests, in scores of healthy volunteers, are likely to go rapidly.
But William A. Haseltine, chairman and chief executive of Human Genome Sciences, said the company won't proceed to the more expensive final phases of safety testing unless it's clear the government is willing to buy the drug. "It has to make economic sense, or we will not proceed with it," he said.
Under new legislation, drugs like this may win FDA approval based only on animal studies of their effectiveness, coupled with human safety tests. That means the drugs may well enter national anti-terror stockpiles without doctors having a clear fix on how to use them.
Theory suggests that an anthrax antibody, like Abthrax, may be useful in several situations. If terrorists create an anthrax strain resistant to antibiotics, an antibody might be the only treatment for exposed people.
An anthrax vaccine is available, but it requires multiple shots over months. By contrast, an antibody injection would in theory confer instant immunity, so it might save the lives of soldiers or workers at risk of exposure to the germ who haven't already been immunized.
Finally, a high proportion of people who develop anthrax symptoms die in spite of receiving antibiotics. The antibiotics attack the germ itself, but not a toxin that it releases into the blood. Drugs like Abthrax are specifically designed to attack the toxin, so they might, in theory, save the lives of people who are not responding well to standard anthrax treatment.
Exactly how well the drug would work may be answered only if there's another terrorist attack with anthrax, like the ones in 2001 that emptied congressional and media offices, killed several postal workers and others, and forced some 10,000 people, including members of Congress and their employees, onto antibiotic therapy as a preventive measure.
Because a drug like Abthrax would generally be useful only in an attack, there's likely to be no routine commercial market for it. Instead, the government has pledged to create a market for such drugs by stockpiling them if they meet certain criteria.
The nation already has large stockpiles of anti-terrorism drugs and supplies, but administrators at the Department of Health and Human Services have complained that they don't have the authority to make long-term purchase commitments that would create a stronger incentive for firms to undertake expensive research and development.
President Bush has asked Congress to fix that by passing Project BioShield, which would commit some $6 billion to anti-terror defenses over 10 years. The National Institutes of Health has said the Human Genome Sciences drug may serve as a test for whether Project BioShield can work.
The legislation has bogged down in Congress. Bush, speaking Monday to biotechnology executives in Washington, demanded again that Congress resolve the issues. "For the sake of our national security, . . . Congress must pass the BioShield legislation as soon as possible," Bush said.

E-learning Bioterrorism Preparedness Training Course Available for Public Health Personnel

The Association of Public Heath Laboratories (APHL) announced at a World Health Organization (WHO) meeting on 23 June the first interactive, online bioterrorism training and response program for clinical laboratory professionals, according to Business Wire. The "Agents of Bioterrorism" program, a collaboration between APHL, the Massachusetts State Laboratory Institute and Boston-based Acadient, an e-learning program developer, is slated as the "first line of an early warning system for recognition of an outbreak or bioterrorism attack." The program's coursework, which can be completed in 1.5 hours, is designed to train microbiologists, medical technologists, doctors nurses and academics to identify the biological agents most likely to be used as terror weapons including anthrax and plague. The training program is expected to be field tested in Massachusetts over the next two months. A demonstration of the coursework can be viewed on Acadient's website.

ANALYSIS: The development of training tools to better assist state public health personnel to identify bioterrorism agents is an important step toward better state bioterrorism preparedness. As the APHL e-learning program is tested in Massachusetts it is hoped that the "course can be used as a prototype for other local, state and worldwide healthcare organizations that need to prepare laboratory professionals to respond to agents of bioterrorism," Acadient president Greg Titus said. Experts continue to remain concerned that state laboratories and public health institutions are unprepared to respond to a bioterrorism attack.

CDC Advisory Group: Smallpox Vaccinations Should not be Expanded to First Responders

An advisory group to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a statement on 19 June recommending that the national smallpox vaccination program not be expanded to first responders until severe heart-related side effects can be further evaluated, according to press reports. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, which meets several times a year to evaluate and advise the CDC on vaccination policies, agreed unanimously that the vaccination program should only be offered to phase one health care workers. Of the 450,000 health care workers eligible to receive the vaccine, less than 10 percent of have volunteered for the program, according to AP. The second phase of the vaccination program aims to vaccinate first responders, like firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical workers. Eventually the smallpox vaccine would be offered to the general public.

ANALYSIS: Based on comments made by CDC Director Dr. Julie Gerberding during a news conference on 19 June, it seems unlikely that the program will come to a complete standstill, especially in light of comments made earlier by other CDC officials that there are currently not enough vaccinated medical personnel to respond to a smallpox attack, AP reported. Gerberding said, "I don't think I hear anything that says, 'Stop the program'...The question of how broad the program is [is] something we must pay attention to. It's absolutely clear we must have preparedness in public health and response teams if we have any hope of mitigating a smallpox attack." Gerberding assured reporters that she and Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson will carefully weigh the advisory group's recommendation with national security concerns before making a decision.

From the "Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security Daily," 20 June:

A Pill for Anthrax Relief? Army in Hot Pursuit

Emisphere Technologies, Inc., a New York pharmaceutical company that specializes in the oral delivery of medicine, is teaming up with the Army’s biodefense laboratory in Frederick, Md., to develop an oral anthrax vaccine, the company said Thursday. The Tarrytown-based company says it can encapsulate vaccines or drugs that normally cannot pass from the intestinal tract into the body. The company also is developing an oral insulin drug for use by diabetics. Emisphere and the Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases facilities at Fort Detrick in Frederick have signed a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) under which the company will not receive federal funding but would be given an exclusive patent and royalty rights should the CRADA produce an oral anthrax vaccine. - David Clarke

June 12, 2003

Monkeypox outbreak tests bioterrorism response systems

By David McGlinchey, Global Security Newswire

U.S. efforts to prepare for a bioterrorist attack have enabled an effective response to this month's outbreak of monkeypox in the United States, according to health officials and public health experts.

"State health departments have been actively involved in planning and preparing for the possibility of a bioterrorist event. We are now seeing that this level of preparation can also assist in unexpected, natural outbreaks," said Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson.

Health officials are investigating 54 suspected cases of monkeypox in four states. The disease is carried by rodents and is similar to smallpox but much less deadly. U.S. officials yesterday recommended the smallpox vaccine to "persons investigating monkeypox outbreaks and involved in caring for infected individuals or animals."

Monkeypox was not mistaken for smallpox, health officials said, but the similarity helped detect the disease quickly and bioterrorism was quickly ruled out.

Health workers are "trained more in clinical recognition of poxes" than they once were, said Lorna Will, an epidemiologist with the Wisconsin Department of Public Health. Wisconsin has reported 20 cases of monkeypox.

The monkeypox outbreak also tested the U.S. ability to respond to a bioterrorism incident, and the public health system performed admirably, officials said.

"Mother Nature has given us a little practice opportunity," said Shelley Hearne, executive director of Trust for America's Health, a nonpartisan public health group.

Hearne compared the monkeypox response to the confused public health reaction during the anthrax mailings of 2002 and said there has "certainly been significant improvement. That's the good news."

She cautioned, however, that the government might be focusing too heavily on a few, select biological threats. To prepare for terrorism, health officials should be prepared to face the "unexpected." The most effective preparation for an unknown biological or chemical threat is a strong public health infrastructure, according to Hearne.

Cuts in public health funding, brought on by nationwide budget shortfalls, risk "undercutting the foundation" of biological and chemical terrorism defenses, she warned.

Health officials said the outbreak was detected and reported quickly.

"Surveillance has certainly been upgraded," said Von Roebuck, a spokesman for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

"I suspect we may have seen monkeypox in the past and we didn't pick it up," Hearne said.

Enhanced communication in the public health community was the most valuable improvement cited by several officials and experts.

The focus on preparing for bioterrorism "helped a lot with communication between hospitals and health departments," according to Will, the Wisconsin epidemiologist.

The CDC was able to effectively alert local health departments, said Roebuck, adding, "the information communication side has been very good, and that's huge, especially in an investigation like this."

Will, who until recently was a clinician, said that doctors now know where to go during a public health emergency.

"When we first started [improving public health infrastructure] people used to call me constantly without a clue," she said. Confused doctors did not know where to report unusual diseases or where to get information on new outbreaks. "I can tell you that as a clinician, I would not have known who to call," she said.

June 16, 2003
Bioterrorism project falls into intelligence gap
By Siobhan Gorman, National Journal

Paul Redmond had a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day recently. It was the day that Redmond, assistant secretary for information analysis at the Homeland Security Department, testified before the House Select Homeland Security Committee about Project BioShield, President Bush's $6 billion anti-bioterrorism project that's been cruising through the House.
Redmond didn't have an opening statement. He admitted he has only one person working under him to assess the bioterror threat. He said he isn't getting the information he needs from the intelligence community. His description of the bioterror threat was nothing more than what lawmakers had already read in the newspapers. And he wasn't prepared to brief them in a closed session. Redmond eventually made a plea for sympathy: "I'm trying to do my best at this point."
Redmond's lack of preparedness on BioShield is evidence of a potentially grave weakness: Redmond's intelligence cupboard is largely bare, yet the department appears to have no trouble launching big expensive programs without having assessed what the country's highest-priority threats are.
"It's certainly symptomatic of a larger problem," Rep. Jim Turner of Texas, the panel's ranking Democrat, said in an interview. "It was clear that the Office of Information Analysis is not functioning the way it was envisioned [by Congress].... It leaves a real security gap."
Redmond's June 5 testimony-or lack of it-before a joint session of two of the House panel's subcommittees triggered bipartisan dismay. Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn., in an interview, described his reaction as one of "shock, depression, outrage, embarrassment, and concern." He added, "They're basically acknowledging that they're useless."
Turner reacted by sending a letter to the president spotlighting his major worries, such as: just a single staff member working to assess the bioterror threat; the department's inability to brief lawmakers on the nature of the bioterror threat; and the department's lack of access to certain top-secret information. Turner's letter brands Redmond's entire office "dysfunctional."
Chairman Christopher Cox, R-Calif., says he is reserving judgment until he learns more about what's going on in the new department's intelligence wing. Still, Cox said, "our committee views information-analysis as the central function of the department ... and we all agree it's too important not to scrutinize these issues carefully."
Cox added that he's concerned more with where the department will be in October, if BioShield is launched then as planned, than where it is now. Homeland Security isn't yet able to determine what anti-terrorism measures should be given top priority, in part because setting up its intelligence unit has been a low priority.
"This is the last part of Homeland Security to come into being, as I understand it," Redmond testified.
A former head of the CIA's counter-espionage center, Redmond reported for duty on March 17. Calling the information-analysis office "the nerve center of the department," Turner told National Journal, "that should have been, and should be, a matter of first priority."
As proposed, BioShield would fund pharmaceutical companies in the latter stages of developing vaccines for those bioterror agents deemed most likely to pose a threat to the nation. The problem is that no one at the department responsible for recommending which vaccines to fund appears to be sitting down with the latest intelligence to rank potential bioterror agents, the scariest of which number at least 80.
"The department is focused on all threats," says spokesman Brian Roehrkasse. Presumably this is where Redmond's bioterrorism army of one should come in. Perhaps before the federal government devotes $6 billion to vaccine R&D, it should spend some money on intelligence-modeling to figure out what vaccines are needed most-lest BioShield become a big-ticket handout for pharmaceutical companies.
There was some good news in Redmond's very bad day: By drawing attention to a major homeland-security problem when something can still be done to rectify it, the hearing demonstrated that congressional oversight can matter. Shays plans to talk with congressional appropriators about how the 2004 budget can shore up the department's information branch.
Roehrkasse now says that 20 more analysts will come on board this month. He also says that, by September, Redmond will have four more people to assess bioterror threats. "In three short months, the information-analytical capabilities of the department have grown. However, we realize that they need to continue to enhance their capability," Roehrkasse said.
BioShield comes under the jurisdiction of three House committees. But only Cox's is giving it real scrutiny. The Energy and Commerce Committee passed the measure by a voice vote on the day it was introduced, May 15. When Government Reform marked it up and voted it out on May 22, only two committee members were there.
But because of the Homeland Security Committee's questions, BioShield's congressional fast track has slowed a bit. The BioShield bill had been slated to be marked up this week by the committee, but the panel has postponed that action.
Meanwhile, if the department doesn't adopt a more intelligence-driven strategy for preventing the spread of bioterror agents, it might need to instead focus its R&D efforts on cleaning up after a bioterror attack. And Project BioShield could be renamed. Call it Project BioMop.

FBI Does Some Heavy-Duty Digging in Md.
Drained Pond Searched for Anthrax Clues

By Marilyn W. Thompson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, June 14, 2003; Page B03

The scene yesterday at a drained pond in Frederick was less reminiscent of the underwater adventures of Jacques Cousteau than it was of plodding Mike Mulligan, the outdated but determined steam shovel.

In a pit of red mud, a bright yellow earthmover chugged up scoop after scoop of rain-drenched dirt, moving it aside for analysis in the second phase of the FBI's search for evidence in the unsolved anthrax case. Along the perimeter, about a dozen men in hard hats and reflective vests worked on various dirty missions. Some gathered around a square container, apparently used as a sifting box. Action was slow but steady, and no one seemed to notice a helicopter full of press gawkers hovering at 400 feet.

After three days spent diverting 1.45 million gallons of water from the one-acre pond -- a process made more taxing by occasional downpours -- yesterday's work was the more important step in the much-discussed anthrax hunt.

The operation is top secret, but law enforcement sources have said that the FBI hopes to find evidence that could have been left behind by the ingenious killer who mailed out a lethal agent in pre-stamped postal envelopes in the fall of 2001.

Five people died and 17 were infected, with more than 10,000 people put at risk of exposure. More broadly, the incident brought the prospect of bioterrorism into the average U.S. household.

The FBI has been unable to solve the baffling "Amerithrax" case, one of its highest priorities, after 18 months of rigorous investigation, using virtually every known modern law enforcement technique. Searches were mounted of homes, outbuildings and rented storage sheds. In military research labs, considered the most likely source of the anthrax bacteria used in the mailings, FBI polygraphs became commonplace. Hundreds were interviewed, and thousands more were asked for leads. Every so often, top FBI officials would head to Capitol Hill to report their progress, offering little hope of an imminent arrest.

Then the isolated pond came to the bureau's attention. A business associate of Steven J. Hatfill -- who has been called a "person of interest" in the case but has not been charged -- told agents about a hypothetical discussion in which Hatfill explained how he might dispose of contaminated material.

FBI agents descended on the Frederick Municipal Forest, a few miles from where Hatfill once lived while working as an Army pathogens researcher. Expert divers were called in to cut through the winter ice and comb the murky waters of about a dozen spring-fed ponds, created years ago to fight forest fires.

Weather prevented a complete search. But the FBI's early discoveries included a mysterious box, something akin to a makeshift scientific glove box, in which laboratory researchers wearing triple layers of latex gloves can safely manipulate deadly pathogens.

A novel theory evolved: Could the killer have waded into water with the contraption and used it to stuff anthrax into envelopes? Could the depths of the pond explain why searches on land had turned up no evidence of contamination? Had the bureau finally solved a nearly perfect crime?

On the edge of the pond yesterday stood an assortment of tarps, tents and trailers, the most prominent emblazoned "FBI" in bold letters.

It appeared that Hollywood's crime-fighting "Men in Black" had become rather grungy "Men in Hip Boots."

Before the search began, FBI agent Bob Roth, a veteran murder investigator, spent weeks communicating with bureaucrats at the Maryland Department of the Environment. There were issues to be sorted out. The state wanted assurances that water would be pumped gradually and properly diverted to avoid flooding. Endangered species would have to be protected, including several spectacular varieties of rare orchid. The state wanted an inspector on-site daily to ensure compliance with regulations.

Although the operation held the potential of great law enforcement breakthroughs, a self-respecting cop might simply have tried to decline this assignment. There were reports of agents being rescued after sinking knee-deep in the voracious goop.

The FBI has informed state and city officials that it may take three to four weeks to finish its work inside the yellow police tape, strung across roads cutting through the woods.

Mountain hikers and orchid lovers will have to be redirected for a while.

When the work is through, the bureau's private contractor will pipe water back into the pond, filling it to its normal level of three to four feet.

The FBI will silently pack up its equipment and troop back to headquarters, revealing nothing of what agents may have found after days of clawing and sifting through the pond's rich, red bottom.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company

New Virginia Lab to Give Bioterror Support to CDC in Case of Attack

A high-tech laboratory, second only to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and a few military labs opened today in Richmond, Virginia, according to the Washington Post. The lab, called "Biotech Six," has more sealed rooms - eight in all - than any other state lab to manage lethal diseases like SARS, West Nile, and tuberculosis. There is also a working plan to build the first state-run "Biosafety Level 4" room to safely contain and test more dangerous pathogens like Ebola, hantavirus, and smallpox. The new facility has been named one of five labs in the nation responsible for 24 hour testing in the event that a biological or chemical attack exceeds the CDC's facilities in Atlanta. Charles Schable, director of bioterrorism preparedness for the CDC's National Center for Infectious Disease said, "We can't always do everything ourselves. This will enhance the nation's capability to respond to a bioterror event."

ANALYSIS: The new lab may be called upon to respond to bioterrorism attacks in the future due to its close proximity to Washington, DC. George Foresman, who advises Virginia Governor Mark Warner, said, "We find ourselves consistently in the bull's-eye of terrorist actions targeted against America. It becomes incumbent upon us...to make sure we have state labs that can handle the spillover." The lab was partially funded by federal homeland security funds, but it still needs $1.7 million to complete delayed construction of its Level 4 testing facility. To save money, the lab has left 20 of its 220 jobs vacant until construction can be complete. Lab Director James L. Pearson said, "It will happen, but it isn't here today."

FBI Draining Pond in Anthrax Investigation
By David Snyder and Marilyn W. Thompson
Washington Post Staff Writers

Monday, June 9, 2003; 11:55 AM

The FBI today began an elaborate operation to drain a rural pond in the Frederick Municipal Forest, hoping to find evidence that might have been dumped there in the fall of 2001 after postal envelopes were stuffed with deadly anthrax bacteria.
In a brief news release, the FBI's Washington field office said that officials from the FBI and U.S. Postal Service are conducting "forensic searches" on the public land, including draining one of about a dozen man-made ponds in the 7,000-acre forest a few miles outside the Frederick city limits.
"These searches are related to the investigation of the origin of the anthrax-laced letters mailed in September and October 2001, which resulted in five deaths and 17 illnesses," the release said. "To facilitate the search activity, one pond will be drained."
The operation, expected to last several weeks and cost about $250,000, follows the discovery last winter of a box and other equipment that authorities say could have been used by the anthrax perpetrator. Tests on the equipment have been inconclusive for the presence of anthrax, but FBI forensic experts continue to analyze the equipment for possible clues.
FBI divers went to the ponds last December and cut through ice to search for possible evidence after a tipster told investigators that Dr. Steven J. Hatfill had once hypothetically described how he might dispose of contaminated equipment. Hatfill has not been charged in the crimes. Attorney General John Ashcroft has described him as a "person of interest" in the case, and he remains under 24-hour FBI surveillance.
A former researcher at the U.S. Army military research lab at Fort Detrick, Hatfill once lived about eight miles from the ponds and has acknowledged through a spokesman that he had visited the ponds during work with the Boy Scouts.
The divers' recoveries in the murky ponds buoyed the hopes of FBI officials, who have been looking for a break in the frustrating 18-month investigation. In numerous searches of homes, outbuildings and other structures, the FBI's anthrax team has found no evidence of how the letter-stuffing operation could have been carried out.
The anthrax letters included two addressed to Sens. Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), which contained a powder so highly refined that many believed it could have killed anyone handling it. This led the FBI to ponder the possibility that the perpetrator had moved the letter-stuffing operation to the ponds, using water as natural protection against the airborne bacteria.
The FBI's news release said that before the draining began, extensive environmental test were conducted. The tests indicated that the draining would pose no threat to the public health or safety. Debbie Weierman, an FBI spokeswoman, declined to comment further.
Frederick city spokeswoman Nancy Poss said FBI officials would brief city officials this morning about the operation.
The pond in question, in the northeast corner of the forest, is one of about a dozen such ponds in the forest that were constructed decades ago as water sources in case fires broke out in the forest. The area is managed by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources. The FBI has coordinated its searches with the department, the Maryland Department of the Environment and city officials.
Staff writer Allan Lengel contributed to this report.

Posted on Thu, Jun. 05, 2003

Lawmakers Consider Anti-Bioterror Plan

LAURA MECKLER
Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Members of Congress complained Thursday about intelligence on Iraqi biological weapons as they considered legislation that would rely on intelligence to help counter bioterror threats at home.

The House Select Committee on Homeland Security is considering a President Bush proposal dubbed Project BioShield, which would give the administration unprecedented authority to research, buy and distribute vaccines and antidotes against pathogens that could be used by bioterrorists.

Among other things, it would guarantee private companies that, if they spend money to create new treatments, the government will buy them.

But a linchpin of the proposal requires the Homeland Security Department to determine what biological agents pose a severe enough threat to trigger the program.

At a committee hearing Thursday, several members of Congress quizzed Homeland Security officials about their ability to make those assessments. Specifically, they noted that U.S. forces have been unable to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, despite intelligence that allegedly said these weapons were there.

"The entire premise of this country going to war with Iraq was that we needed to rid the rogue nation of weapons of mass destruction," said Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss. "To this date, no weapons of mass destruction have been found. ... We sent our brave men and women into war under false pretenses."

He said that in order to determine what projects to fund under BioShield, officials must have reliable intelligence about the threat.

Paul Redmond, assistant secretary for information analysis at the Homeland Security Department, responded that he had no information about intelligence concerning Iraq, though other administration officials have expressed confidence that biological weapons will ultimately be found there.

Members also pressed Redmond to specify the most troubling bioterror threats.

"If the threat is as serious as some would suggest, this committee need to hear about it," said Rep. Jim Turner of Texas, the top Democrat on the panel.

Redmond said he was not prepared to disclose detailed information on threats. He added that the department does not yet have a full handle on what pathogens pose the most serious danger.

He spoke in general of the threat posed by anthrax and botulinum toxin, two of the biological agents that most concern experts.

Redmond said he and one other person are now working to assess the threat. Under questioning, he said he did not need any further resources to do his job.

"We're here to help you," said Rep. Christopher Cox, R-Calif., the panel's chairman. "We're not getting very far very fast today." He said the committee's purpose is to provide the department with the money it needs for this "enormous job."

"The impression you've left is it's the two of you working with the outside world," Cox said.

Redmond responded that he plans to hire two to three others to help. "We're just getting started," he said.

Turner didn't buy it. "It causes me to have grave concern that we are not doing the job in the way the legislation envisions," he said.

Overall, the BioShield legislation enjoys broad support. The only significant controversy has been whether the program should be singled out for special, automatic funding, as Bush wants, or whether it should have to compete with other programs in the budget for dollars. A bill approved by the House Commerce Committee requires it to go through the normal budgeting process, while a Senate version makes the funding automatic.

Anthrax detection test delayed
Associated Press

May 31, 2003

WASHINGTON -- A test of a new anthrax detection system planned for Monday in more than a dozen cities is being postponed, the U.S. Postal Service said Friday.

The system, which uses rapid DNA testing to detect the germs, was developed after anthrax pores were mailed to several prominent people in 2001. The cases resulted in five deaths and made many more ill.

The 30-day exercise, with test sites including Rockford, Ill., had been scheduled after a preliminary run in Baltimore.

However, postal vice president Azeezaly Jaffer said Friday that more time was needed to work with the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and local authorities in the test cities to develop guidelines on test results.

The detection systems have been installed in 14 cities and are ready for use, he said. No new date to begin the tests was announced.

The other test sites are Dulles, Va.; Capitol Heights, Md.; Albany, N.Y.; Edison, N.J.; Manasota, St. Petersburg and Tampa, Fla.; Midland, Texas; Los Angeles; Tacoma, Wash.; Lancaster and Pittsburgh, Pa.; and Cleveland.

Copyright © 2003, Chicago Tribune

CQ HOMELAND SECURITY - WEAPONS
May 23, 2003 - 7:16 p.m.
Pentagon Calls Al Qaeda's Bioweapons Effort 'Sophisticated'
By Christopher Logan, CQ Staff Writer

According to a new Pentagon report, the Al Qaeda terrorist organization pursued "a sophisticated biological weapons research program" for several years before launching its 2001 attacks on the United States.
The assertion, on its face, suggests that Osama bin Laden's network was much closer to producing deadly biological weapons than previously indicated by the U.S. discovery of rudimentary laboratories and disturbing videotapes of gassed dogs in its Afghan training camps.
But terrorism experts say the statement, included in the Pentagon's 2002 Chemical and Biological Defense Program report to Congress last week, actually says very little about what al Qaeda is or is not capable of doing.
"It depends what you mean by 'sophisticated,' said John V. Parachini, a weapons policy analyst with the Rand Corp. "Some people would say it means they are able to culture agents that are very difficult to work with. Others would say it means they're capable of extracting ricin from castor beans."
Much of the report was classified. But the bulk of the evidence that has not been classified seems to indicate al Qaeda continues to have a fairly crude biological and chemical weapons program. Exhibit A is the vidoetape of experiments in which dogs were exposed to deadly gases mixed up in a small container.
"That didn't look particularly sophisticated," Parachini said.
But Daniel Benjamin, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and author of "The Age of Sacred Terror," a book on the rise of al Qaeda, said Osama bin Laden's organization maintains a fairly sophisticated biological weapons capability.
"Anthrax," Benjamin responded when asked what is meant by "sophisticated."
"Al Qaeda has had an interest in chemical and biological weapons for years and years. They were involved in the Sudanese biological weapons program in Khartoum, and we know that from an al Qaeda defector who testified in federal court."
Benjamin also pointed out that documents found during the arrest of bin Laden deputy Khalid Sheik Mohammed in Pakistan on March 1 indicated al Qaeda may actually have produced some weaponized anthrax.
Al Qaeda leaders "completed plans and obtained the materials required to manufacture two biological toxins - botulinum and salmonella - and the chemical poison cyanide," the documents showed, according to a report in The Washington Post. "They are also close to a feasible production plan for anthrax."

Smokeless Gun
But the documents alone don't represent a proverbial "smoking gun."
As Parachini points out, al Qaeda so far has not used either chemical or biological weapons.
In fact, it seems to favor conventional explosives, putting it in the same camp as most terrorist organizations.
"They go with what works," said Neil C. Livingstone, president of GlobalOptions, Inc, a Washington counterterrorism advisory group, who said he is skeptical about reports of al Qaeda's sophistication.
"They did find some basic stuff - internet material, books, some labs - and they experimented with animals at one point. But the lab was like something you'd have in your garage here," Livingstone said.
"Clearly, there was an effort to buy materials," Livingstone added. "I heard they were going around Russia and other places trying find people willing to sell stuff to them. .... Apparently they were also trying to find young Muslim microbiologists they could bring into their program."
Parachini said the Pentagon, in its report, is repeating a statement CIA Director George Tenet made to Congress earlier this year in which he, too, called al Qaeda's biological capabilities "sophisticated."
The Agency is currently conducting an in-house review of its intelligence estimates of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, none of which have been discovered to date.
"What we've seen in the open literature so far indicates they were not sophisticated," Parchini said of al Qaeda. "Maybe there's information in the restricted environment that shows otherwise. But we can't inspect that evidence.
"That al Qaeda contemplated something dastardly is certainly disconcerting, " he said, "but was it sophisticated? Can they actually do it? That remains a question."

Postal Anthrax Testing to Expand
New Security System to Undergo 30-Day Trial at 14 Sites
By Michael Zimmerman
Special to The Washington Post
Monday, May 26, 2003; Page A27

The U.S. Postal Service plans next week to greatly expand the testing of a new security system to detect against bioterror agents, the direct result of the anthrax attacks of October 2001, when two employees lost their lives at the Brentwood postal facility in Northeast Washington.
The system, which runs a continuing analysis on the mail, has been tested successfully for about nine months in Baltimore, said Thomas G. Day, the Postal Service's vice president of engineering. On June 1, the test will be expanded to 14 postal sites across the country, including those in Dulles and Capitol Heights. After a 30-day trial, postal officials will determine whether the system is good enough to deploy nationally.
Day, at a briefing last month, said the biohazard detection system (BDS) was developed and tested after consulting with the military, federal agencies and other experts. Northrop Grumman Corp. and partners designed the prototype BDS, which Day said "performs a rapid, on-site DNA test for anthrax by testing the air surrounding mail-handling equipment for anthrax particles."
The system performs 10,000 tests a night, so if there is a positive match for anthrax DNA, the network computer will provide immediate on-site notification, alerting local and national officials. An emergency response plan would then be activated.
"In approximately 30 days, we'll have the results of various test sites and hopefully, this will lead to the validation of the new BDS system," Day said.
Postal officials declined to provide the cost of the system; they said the biohazard operation is funded by appropriations. The system has proved reliable, accurate and very sensitive, Day said.
But many postal employees, angered by what they thought was a lack of concern from management at the beginning of the anthrax attacks, are a little wary about the Postal Service's efforts, including the new detection equipment being tested, to protect them.
"Anything is a help, but how effective, I'm not sure, and I don't trust them," said Helen Lewis, a processing clerk with the Postal Service for almost 30 years. She was a friend of Thomas L. Morris Jr., one of the employees who died of anthrax inhalation. The Brentwood facility was renamed for Morris and Joseph P. Curseen, the other employee who died.
Dena Briscoe, head of Brentwood Exposed, a support group of employees, said the BDS looks like a good idea but "the employees need to be assured that safety is a top priority." She has been a postal clerk for 22 years and works out of the Calvert facility in Hyattsville.
According to the Postal Service, in the event of another anthrax attack, all personnel would be evacuated and mail centers would shut down. Alan Ferranto, director of Safety and Health for the National Association of Letter Carriers, said they have learned a lot since 2001; one of the most important courses of action, he believes, is communication.
"There is a task force that meets continually," he said. "The union and management meet, and they are looking at the protocols that are in place."
"Employees are happy to see that something is being done. However, they still remain concerned because no system is foolproof," says Sally Davidow, spokeswoman for the American Postal Workers Union, which represents postal clerks, drivers and maintenance employees.

May 21, 2003
U.S. Analysts Link Iraq Labs to Germ Arms
By JUDITH MILLER and WILLIAM J. BROAD

United States intelligence agencies have concluded that two mysterious trailers found in Iraq were mobile units to produce germs for weapons, but they have found neither biological agents nor evidence that the equipment was used to make such arms, according to senior administration officials.
The officials said intelligence analysts in Washington and Baghdad reached their conclusion about the trailers after analyzing, and rejecting, alternative theories of how they could have been used. Their consensus was in a paper presented to the White House late Monday.
"The experts who have crawled over this again and again can come up with no other plausible legitimate use," said one senior official who examined the evidence in detail. One theory that was rejected had recently been put forward by Iraqi scientists who said one of the units was used to produce hydrogen.
Officials in Iraq and Washington emphasized in interviews that because the unit studied in greatest detail had been thoroughly decontaminated with a still-unidentified caustic agent, it was impossible to say whether it had ever produced agents for bioweapons.
"It may have, we don't know," a senior administration official said. "What we know is that it is equipped to do that."
The intelligence analysts' judgment would support some of the evidence that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell presented on Feb. 5 to the United Nations in an effort to build support for the war in Iraq. But their failure to find biological agents raises continuing questions about whether Saddam Hussein's regime had actually made germ weapons, as administration officials claimed.
The administration has come under growing political pressure in recent weeks to show clear evidence to back those claims. Officials said that they expect that the intelligence community's conclusion about the mobile units to become a centerpiece of their argument that Iraq had a well-concealed germ weapons program. Yesterday in Baghdad a military official said that American forces would invite international experts to examine the mobile units, The Associated Press reported.
The six-page white paper, entitled Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Production Plants, contains a description of the three trailer units found so far in Iraq and dismisses at least three alternative explanations for their use, an official said yesterday.
The official said it describes two of the labs as production units, and the third as a biological laboratory that could be used for a germ weapons program or for peaceful purposes.
The paper called the trailers an "ingeniously simple, self-contained bioprocessing system," one official said. The paper rejected theories that the two mobile production units were intended to make hydrogen gas for weather balloons or germs for biopesticides to protect crops, or to regenerate rocket fuel.
Repeatedly pressed to discuss the basis for these conclusions, administration officials provided photographs of one of the trailers, a schematic diagram of how experts believe it could have made deadly germs, and interviews with technical experts and other analysts who have observed the units most closely.
This trailer has been analyzed by at least three groups of allied intelligence and technical experts. After it was turned over last month to American soldiers by Kurdish forces near Mosul, three experts from a Pentagon chemical and biological intelligence support team conducted a four-day examination. Assisted by British experts, the team concluded that the trailer was a mobile biological production unit, its members said.
A second group of military and other experts from Washington was then flown to Baghdad, where further tests were conducted. In interviews, one of these experts said he too had concluded that the unit was intended to be a germ producer.
Finally, experts at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and other national security units assessed the drawings, reviewed statements by Iraqi scientists still in Iraq and the Iraqi source of one early report that there were mobile germ factories in Iraq.
Within the past 10 days, officials said, Iraqi scientists at Al Kindi, a research and testing facility in northern Iraq, where allied forces found one of the units, told American experts that the two production units were mobile plants to make hydrogen for filling weather balloons.
But American intelligence analysts said that after exhaustively examining evidence to support this theory, they concluded it is a false story, possibly conceived to mislead them.
Each of the two trailer units contains a 2,000-liter vessel. The Iraqi scientists asserted that the vessel was used to mix chemicals together to produce hydrogen gas. But American officials said that engineering surveys and other evidence strongly suggested that the vessel is a fermenter used to multiply seed germs of anthrax and possibly other agents into deadly swarms. Face plates on the vessels show that they were made in 2002 and 2003.
Officials said they were continuing to test residue in the vessel. They said that while it has not yet been identified, it appeared to contain traces of aluminum, a metal that can be used to produce hydrogen. They said it might have been planted by Iraqis to create the illusion that the units had made gas for weather balloons.
American military officers in Iraq said they believe that Iraqi scientists remain reluctant to speak candidly about Mr. Hussein's weapons programs because they fear they could be implicated in possible war crimes or face retribution from members of the fallen regime who are at large.
One senior administration observed that the mobile laboratories were a violation of Security Council resolutions, whether or not they were used to produce weapons. "It was surely capable of producing biological weapons agent," he said. "Iraq never told the United Nations that it had made such units."
"Why would you have a covert program for filling weather balloons?" the official said.
Late last year, Iraq stated in its formal declaration to the United Nations that the mobile facilities were "refrigeration vehicles and food testing laboratories."
American intelligence officials said that the Iraqi defector who first told Western officials about the existence of the mobile plants was shown photographs of the units found in Iraq. The Iraqi, a chemical engineer, said that the trailers appeared to be modern versions of a germ production unit he had supervised.
The big vessels in two of the units could be used to produce an estimated 500 liters of liquid anthrax and 50 liters of botulinum toxin per batch within two to three days - millions of lethal doses.
"Those are definitely more than terrorist quantities of these agents," said David R. Franz, a senior scientist and former head of the Army defensive biological lab at Fort Detrick, Md.
The schematic diagram was prepared by American experts who have closely studied the most intact production unit. Aside from the central fermenter vessel, there was a tank they believe was for germ food, a compressor to feed air into the fermenter and a refrigeration unit to cool it. The diagram shows that the factory has a system of post-fermenter processing that consists of a compressor that experts said was to remove any gases and dangerous spores and bottle them up in tanks.
Civilian experts on Iraq's program and biological weapons said this gas-capture system appeared to be a hallmark of a clandestine facility, and strongly reinforced the idea that the mobile units were for the production of biological weapons. If spores and signature gasses from the germ food escaped the unit, experts said, inspectors down wind with sensitive detectors might be able to detect the illegal manufacturing.
After being shown some of this material, several civilian experts in biological weapons agreed with the government's consensus.
"There is no doubt in my mind," said William C. Patrick III, a senior official in the United States biological warfare program decades ago. "This is a very simple production facility for an easy-to-grow organism like anthrax."

From the "Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security Daily," 20 May:

‘Swipes’ for Getting Icky Chemical or Biological Agents Off Your Face? Pentagon’s Looking into It.

A discreet Pentagon unit that is developing counterterrorism contract proposals for the Department of Homeland Security has announced a new round of ambitious product ideas to help individual Americans cope with chemical or biological poisons. One idea proposed by the Technical Support Working Group is a “sponge-like” mitt soaked with special decontamination chemicals that victims could wipe over their faces and limbs. “The kit could be handed out to ambulatory and coherent victims for use with minimum instruction,” said a May 14, 2003 announcement calling for bids from contractors. Another idea is a $10 personal decontamination kit which includes both “a simple mask to minimize inhalation and a capability to quickly remove or neutralize biological agent aerosol materials on people’s skin, hair and clothing.” A third envisions a “low cost shelter-in-place kit” to protect people who find themselves in public places at the time of an attack. Deadline for an initial proposal is June 13, 2003.-Jim McGee
• Visit the TSWG solicitation homepage http://www.bids.tswg.gov/tswg/bids.nsf/Main?OpenFrameset&5MPR3E.

Postal Service Expanding Anthrax Detection Pilot

The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) will expand a pilot program to detect anthrax and other biological agents in the mail to 14 cities beginning 1 June, following "several months" of testing in Baltimore. Tom Day, postal vice president for engineering said, "We have carefully reviewed its results and we are now confident that it is working successfully," AP reported. The expanded testing will be conducted for 30 days, after which the technology could be installed "in all of the 282 postal plants that sort the nation's mail," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported.

ANALYSIS: The $3.7 million pilot project in Baltimore employed a system using Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) technology to test for traces of anthrax DNA. Northrop Grumman Corp.'s Security Systems LLC provided the technology for the pilot, with Cepheid Inc., Smiths Detection, and Sceptor Industries providing equipment for the detection system. The "Automated Bio-agent Detection System collects and analyzes air samples from mail-sorting systems," according to Northrop Grumman. PCR technology allows rapid testing using only trace amounts of the anthrax bacteria. William O'Neill, systems analyst and engineer for USPS told the Post-Gazette that the system "could be altered to also screen mail for other potential agents of bioterrorism such as the smallpox virus."

Bioshield program likely to become law despite challenges: report

Although some experts question whether the Bush administration's plan to encourage production of treatments and vaccines for bioterrorism agents will succeed, the bill to implement the plan "appears to be on a sure path to becoming law," according to a 12 May Chicago Tribune report. Project Bioshield would provide $6 billion over 10 years to: "Ensure that resources are available to pay for 'next-generation' medical countermeasures; Strengthen NIH development capabilities by speeding research and development on medical countermeasures based on the most promising recent scientific discoveries; and, Give the FDA the ability to make promising treatments quickly available in emergency situations," according to the White House. The Tribune reported that "scientists and biotechnology industry officials say that while the proposed funding and decade-long time frame sound like a lot, they aren't nearly enough to get all the best researchers and companies that will be required to shift gears to biodefense work." "Biotech companies also want protection from antitrust laws and product liability lawsuits that could arise from their work on vaccines against biological weapons."

ANALYSIS: Although Senate and House action on the bill appears likely to result in a Bioshield law eventually, conflicts have arisen in Congress over "the bill's central provision-a guaranteed, mandatory funding mechanism for firms that undertake development of anti-bioterror products," the Tribune said. These conflicts have slowed work on the bill, however, "the House Energy and Commerce Committee may try again [15 May] to mark up [the Bioshield bill]," CongressDaily reported.

Guidance for bioterrorism funding released

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced on 9 May that it had released guidance for $1.4 billion in FY 2003 bioterrorism preparedness and response funding. The funding includes $870 million from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for public health preparedness and $498 million from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) for hospital preparedness. Guidance for the CDC funding "focuses on seven areas that include preparedness planning and readiness assessment, surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory capacity for handling biologic agents, laboratory capacity for handling chemical agents, health alert network and information technology, communicating health risks and health information dissemination, and education and training." The HRSA guidelines "outline six priority areas [including] governance, regional surge capacity to handle terrorism victims, emergency medical services, hospital linkages to public health departments, education and preparedness training, and terrorism preparedness exercises."

ANALYSIS: About 20 percent of the $1.4 billion has been available to states since March 2003 to "support current activities, including smallpox vaccination for selected health workers and emergency responders." States must submit plans to HHS detailing how they will spend the funding. Upon approval of these plans, CDC and HRSA will distribute the remainder of the funds.

New Find Reignites Anthrax Probe
Evidence From Pond May Indicate Killer's Method

By Marilyn W. Thompson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, May 11, 2003; Page A01

The FBI has developed a new theory on a central mystery of the 2001 anthrax attacks after finding evidence in a Frederick, Md., pond that may suggest how an ingenious criminal could have packed deadly anthrax spores into envelopes without killing or sickening himself, according to sources close to the investigation.

A piece of equipment and other evidence recovered this winter from ice-covered ponds in Frederick Municipal Forest have reinvigorated the 18-month-old case, leading officials to explore a novel theory with shades of science fiction. Some involved in the case believe that the killer may have waded into shallow water to delicately manipulate anthrax bacteria into envelopes, working within a partly submerged airtight chamber. When finished, the killer could have easily hidden the evidence by simply dumping contaminated equipment and clothing into the pond.

Publicly, the FBI has said nothing about material that divers recovered during the elaborate search missions in December and January, which involved cutting through thick ice atop about a dozen spring-fed ponds on the city-owned parkland. Debra Weierman, media coordinator for the FBI's Washington Field Office, which supervises the case, declined to comment on the findings or on any law enforcement theories about how the crimes might have been carried out.

But sources close to the case said the discoveries were so compelling that the FBI now plans to drain one of the ponds in another search for sunken evidence. The FBI has notified the city of Frederick and the Maryland Department of Natural Resources that it will begin the operation by June 1 and expects to pump thousands of gallons of water from a single pond into the others and a nearby reservoir. Additional agents have been assigned to the case, code-named Amerithrax.

Two sources familiar with the items recovered from the pond described a clear box, with holes that could accommodate gloves to protect the user as he worked. Also recovered were vials wrapped in plastic.

Not everyone involved in the case subscribes to the theory. Some believe that the killer could have completed the task on land and simply dumped materials into the pond to avoid detection.

These investigators contend that the water theory is the result of the FBI's interest in one subject, Steven J. Hatfill, a medical doctor and bioterrorism expert who formerly worked as a researcher at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Frederick. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft has described Hatfill as "a person of interest" in the investigation.

Hatfill has a varied background in science and medicine that includes research for NASA and exploration in Antarctica. On a résumé he sent several years ago to federal agencies, Hatfill, a former member of the Rhodesian special forces who received medical training in South Africa, lists a postgraduate diploma in diving and underwater medicine from a South African naval training institute.

Hatfill's attorney, Thomas Connolly, called the water theory "far-fetched" and said Hatfill had nothing to do with the anthrax crimes.

The evidence found in the pond has buoyed the FBI's hopes for resolution of the baffling case, which claimed five lives, sickened 13 other people and exposed thousands more to the lethal bacteria. The attacks involved a series of letters mailed in pre-stamped envelopes to media outlets in Florida and New York and to the offices of Sens. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.). While en route, the letters passed through various post offices and postal distribution centers along the East Coast and left a trail of contamination.

The five people who died from inhalation anthrax included two postal workers at the Brentwood postal facility in Washington, a Florida photojournalist, a New York hospital worker and a 94-year-old woman in Connecticut.

Entering the water to manipulate virulent anthrax bacteria would provide some degree of natural protection from finely ground spores, which disperse in the air and can live for decades in the soil. But expert opinions vary on whether spores from contaminated equipment could later be found in a natural body of water.

Several scientists suggested that the spores would likely disperse and be difficult to trace, but they said it would be wise to test sediment at the bottom of the pond for the possible presence of hardy microbes.

The FBI's theory could explain why, after numerous searches of homes, buildings and open land, investigators have failed to locate any sign of anthrax contamination. It would suggest that the criminal had experience doing complicated manual tasks in water and was highly skilled in the use of small laboratory tools to work within an airtight glove box or bag.

Some FBI officials involved in the case have theorized that the killer could have put both dry envelopes and secured anthrax powder into an airtight, waterproof chamber, sealed it shut, then stood in the water while filling the envelopes. When finished, the envelopes could be secured inside layers of zip-lock plastic bags and removed from the protective chamber.

The most commonly used devices for handling dangerous pathogens are known as glove boxes or bags. They feature polyurethane gloves built into the chambers. Scientists usually wear additional layers of gloves for added protection.

The devices come in all sizes and range in price from simple models that cost less than $150 to custom-designed varieties that are priced at $10,000 or more. The Justice Department secured the sales records of major U.S. glove box and bag manufacturers soon after the anthrax attacks occurred.

The FBI has come under criticism for the pace of the investigation, which has involved dozens of agents and cutting-edge laboratory analysis.

The pond findings, the sources said, offer the first possible physical evidence in a case that, thus far, has been built almost exclusively on circumstantial clues considered too tenuous to lead to criminal charges.

But the case still has significant weaknesses, the sources said. A major problem is that the FBI has found no evidence linking anyone to the actual mailing of the letters. The two most deadly letters, to Daschle and Leahy, are believed to have been mailed from a highly visible mailbox in the village of Princeton, N.J., just across the street from the Princeton University campus. The box, which tested positive for anthrax, was removed from its concrete footings in August 2002 and shipped to Army labs for testing.

The water theory has increased investigators' interest in Hatfill, who formerly lived in an apartment outside Fort Detrick's main gate that is about eight miles from the ponds.

Based on a tip, FBI teams rushed to seal off the municipal forest in late December and sent divers into the ponds, which were created decades ago to provide water in case of forest fires. The FBI said at the time that it was looking for equipment that might have been used in the crimes. Since then, a team of FBI agents has returned occasionally to the site.

The pond searches represented another flurry of activity in an investigation that had appeared stalled.

Soon after the anthrax letters surfaced, the FBI released a psychological profile of the likely suspect, describing a disgruntled, middle-aged white male with scientific training and some experience working in government research labs. Agents scrambled to interview a short list of people who fit the profile, then seemed to focus on Hatfill. After Ashcroft called Hatfill a "person of interest" in the probe, Hatfill held two news conferences to adamantly proclaim his innocence.

He remains under round-the-clock FBI surveillance, and his attorney, Connolly, said he has refused recent approaches from the FBI. Connolly said Hatfill cannot find a job because of the unjustified FBI scrutiny.

Connolly said it would not be unusual for the FBI to find scientific equipment discarded in waters around Frederick, which is home to many research labs and biotech companies. He suggested that equipment dredged from the pond could have been discarded by a drug dealer operating a methamphetamine lab.

The FBI also has questioned Hatfill's associates about a device he used in much of his recent research. Hatfill had federal backing for projects using the "rotary cell culture system," a small device developed by NASA researchers to rapidly culture cells. It is marketed by Synthecon, a small Texas company.

While at USAMRIID between 1997 and 1999, Hatfill had the backing of a federal health agency for a project in which he sought to use the culturing device to develop a "Universal Pathogen System." He hoped to grow pathogens that had proved difficult to culture, including possibly the smallpox virus, according to his proposal. Hatfill said the project would help researchers trying to quickly analyze emerging infectious diseases.

Roger Akers, a Synthecon vice president and a friend of Hatfill's who worked with him on an unpublished bioterrorism thriller, said he was questioned by FBI agents in recent months about whether Hatfill could have used the rotary cell culture device to grow anthrax bacteria. Akers said he found the questions silly, because anthrax bacteria are easy to grow without the aid of such sophisticated equipment.

Akers said Hatfill was trained in the use of the cell culture system, which he employed both at USAMRIID and during a previous government research appointment at a division of the National Institutes of Health.

The FBI has reviewed the manuscript of Hatfill's novel, which is on file at the U.S. Copyright Office.

Staff writers Allan Lengel and David Snyder contributed to this report.

CQ TODAY - HOMELAND SECURITY
May 7, 2003 - 8:54 p.m.
House Bill Would Authorize $6 Billion to Fight Bioterrorism
By Rebecca Adams, CQ Staff

The House Energy and Commerce Committee on Thursday is expected to approve legislation that would authorize about $6 billion over 10 years for vaccines, treatments or services to combat bioterrorism.
The unnumbered measure, a Bush administration priority, would authorize funding for research and production of vaccines to defend against biological attacks with smallpox, anthrax, botulism toxin, and dangerous pathogens such as Ebola and plague.
It would allow the secretary of Health and Human Services to buy equipment to address threats and give the Food and Drug Administration leeway to expedite the approval process for vaccines and treatments.
The measure is stalled in the Senate because of objections from Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va. The Senate version would designate the spending as an entitlement; Byrd wants Congress to have more oversight of the program.
It was unclear Wednesday night how the House would address that concern.
"We're still working on the funding mechanism," said committee spokesman Ken Johnson, adding that the bill had not been formally introduced because final negotiations were continuing. But committee GOP aides said they were optimistic a bipartisan deal could be reached.
Last week, Homeland Security Committee Chairman Christopher Cox, R-Calif., said the measure would be different than the Senate version. Although the program would be an entitlement, Cox said Congress would be given a strong oversight role through annual appropriations reviews.

Suspected Bioweapon Mobile Lab Recovered
Results of U.S. Probe on Iraqi Vehicle Due Today
By Walter Pincus and Michael Dobbs
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, May 7, 2003; Page A01

A suspected mobile biological weapons lab has been recovered in northern Iraq, a development that senior U.S. officials said yesterday would lend support to Bush administration allegations of a banned weapons program by the government of deposed Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.
A senior administration official said the Pentagon will announce today the results of a two-week investigation into a tractor-trailer truck that was stolen from a government depot in the northern Iraqi town of Mosul and later handed over to U.S. forces. He said equipment found on the truck included a fermenter bolted to the floor that could be used for the production of biological agents.
The official said the truck and the equipment inside it had been cleaned with bleach and, therefore, did not show any identifiable residue of biological agents. But intelligence analysts have concluded that "there doesn't seem to be any legitimate use for it, other than as a biolab."
The existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, in violation of U.N. resolutions dating to 1991, was a major part of the Bush administration's rationale for invading Iraq and overthrowing Hussein. But the administration has been unable to point to concrete evidence of illegal Iraqi weapons activity nearly a month after the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces.
The truck-mounted lab is of the type described by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the U.N. Security Council in February, when he outlined what he said was a pattern of concealment by the Hussein government.
But intelligence officials said yesterday that they were still trying to determine whether it was ever used to produce biological agents and, if so, when it was operated that way.
The search for illegal weapons in Iraq has coincided with a hunt for billions of dollars in financial assets accumulated by Hussein and his family. Treasury and State Department officials said yesterday that investigators were trying to recover an estimated $1 billion in cash seized from the Iraqi central bank in Baghdad on Hussein's instructions in the hours leading up to the U.S. attack on Iraq.
The size of the bank heist, which reportedly involved enough $100 bills to fill three tractor-trailers, is an indication of the challenges facing investigators as they seek to track down billions of dollars in ill-gotten Iraqi assets scattered around the world. Much of the money was raised through illegal oil smuggling operations to circumvent the U.N. sanctions that were imposed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
According to U.S. officials and private investigators, Hussein used a network of front companies from Switzerland to Panama to purchase both conventional and unconventional weapons. Little attempt was made to separate the funds allegedly used for buying the ingredients of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons from the money used for building presidential palaces and subsidizing the lavish lifestyles of Hussein and his two sons, Uday and Qusay.
Officials said the truck suspected of serving as a mobile biological lab was stolen from an Iraqi government site near Mosul as Kurdish militia and U.S. Special Forces units moved into the city. When the thief saw what he had taken, he turned it over to Kurdish troops, who handed it over to U.S. officials.
A senior administration official said the truck resembled one of the mobile laboratories described by Powell in his Feb. 5 speech to the Security Council. Powell used diagrams to describe the interior of the mobile labs, based on what he said was information from an Iraqi chemical engineer who had witnessed an accident in which 12 technicians died from exposure to biological agents.
According to Powell, information from Iraqi defectors proved that Iraq had "at least seven of these mobile biological agent factories." As he described the system, two or three trucks would typically park alongside each other, connected by hoses when they were in production mode.
A senior intelligence official said analysts had concluded that the truck found near Mosul was not being used to transport equipment because the fermenter was bolted down and the rest of the equipment and systems were built-in.
U.N. inspectors who worked in Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War heard about the mobile trucks in interviews with Iraqi scientists, but they never located one.
Terence Taylor, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-U.S. and a former U.N. weapons inspector, said yesterday that the mobile labs appeared to be linked to the Iraqi deception programs. "We found evidence that, during the 1990s, the Iraqis were using container trucks to move equipment away from inspectors," he said. "It was nothing to move one extra step."
The looting of the Iraqi central bank by former Hussein aides was first reported by the New York Times and confirmed by State Department and Treasury Department officials. According to the Times, quoting an Iraqi bank official, the operation was personally supervised by Hussein's second son, Qusay, who appeared at the bank with a seizure order signed by Hussein.
Over the past few weeks, U.S. troops have recovered stacks of dollar bills at